Function init [src]
Initiates a TLS handshake and establishes a TLSv1.2 or TLSv1.3 session.
host is only borrowed during this function call.
input is asserted to have buffer capacity at least min_buffer_len.
Prototype
pub fn init(input: *Reader, output: *Writer, options: Options) InitError!Client Parameters
input: *Readeroutput: *Writeroptions: Options Possible Errors
The alert description will be stored in alert.
Source
pub fn init(input: *Reader, output: *Writer, options: Options) InitError!Client {
assert(input.buffer.len >= min_buffer_len);
const host = switch (options.host) {
.no_verification => "",
.explicit => |host| host,
};
const host_len: u16 = @intCast(host.len);
var random_buffer: [176]u8 = undefined;
crypto.random.bytes(&random_buffer);
const client_hello_rand = random_buffer[0..32].*;
var key_seq: u64 = 0;
var server_hello_rand: [32]u8 = undefined;
const legacy_session_id = random_buffer[32..64].*;
var key_share = KeyShare.init(random_buffer[64..176].*) catch |err| switch (err) {
// Only possible to happen if the seed is all zeroes.
error.IdentityElement => return error.InsufficientEntropy,
};
const extensions_payload = tls.extension(.supported_versions, array(u8, tls.ProtocolVersion, .{
.tls_1_3,
.tls_1_2,
})) ++ tls.extension(.signature_algorithms, array(u16, tls.SignatureScheme, .{
.ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
.ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
.rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
.rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
.rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
.rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
.rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
.rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
.rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
.rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
.rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
.rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
.ed25519,
})) ++ tls.extension(.supported_groups, array(u16, tls.NamedGroup, .{
.x25519_ml_kem768,
.secp256r1,
.secp384r1,
.x25519,
})) ++ tls.extension(.psk_key_exchange_modes, array(u8, tls.PskKeyExchangeMode, .{
.psk_dhe_ke,
})) ++ tls.extension(.key_share, array(
u16,
u8,
int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.NamedGroup.x25519_ml_kem768)) ++
array(u16, u8, key_share.ml_kem768_kp.public_key.toBytes() ++ key_share.x25519_kp.public_key) ++
int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.NamedGroup.secp256r1)) ++
array(u16, u8, key_share.secp256r1_kp.public_key.toUncompressedSec1()) ++
int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.NamedGroup.secp384r1)) ++
array(u16, u8, key_share.secp384r1_kp.public_key.toUncompressedSec1()) ++
int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.NamedGroup.x25519)) ++
array(u16, u8, key_share.x25519_kp.public_key),
));
const server_name_extension = int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.ExtensionType.server_name)) ++
int(u16, 2 + 1 + 2 + host_len) ++ // byte length of this extension payload
int(u16, 1 + 2 + host_len) ++ // server_name_list byte count
.{0x00} ++ // name_type
int(u16, host_len);
const server_name_extension_len = switch (options.host) {
.no_verification => 0,
.explicit => server_name_extension.len + host_len,
};
const extensions_header =
int(u16, @intCast(extensions_payload.len + server_name_extension_len)) ++
extensions_payload ++
server_name_extension;
const client_hello =
int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_2)) ++
client_hello_rand ++
[1]u8{32} ++ legacy_session_id ++
cipher_suites ++
array(u8, tls.CompressionMethod, .{.null}) ++
extensions_header;
const out_handshake = .{@intFromEnum(tls.HandshakeType.client_hello)} ++
int(u24, @intCast(client_hello.len - server_name_extension.len + server_name_extension_len)) ++
client_hello;
const cleartext_header_buf = .{@intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.handshake)} ++
int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_0)) ++
int(u16, @intCast(out_handshake.len - server_name_extension.len + server_name_extension_len)) ++
out_handshake;
const cleartext_header = switch (options.host) {
.no_verification => cleartext_header_buf[0 .. cleartext_header_buf.len - server_name_extension.len],
.explicit => &cleartext_header_buf,
};
{
var iovecs: [2][]const u8 = .{ cleartext_header, host };
try output.writeVecAll(iovecs[0..if (host.len == 0) 1 else 2]);
try output.flush();
}
var tls_version: tls.ProtocolVersion = undefined;
// These are used for two purposes:
// * Detect whether a certificate is the first one presented, in which case
// we need to verify the host name.
var cert_index: usize = 0;
// * Flip back and forth between the two cleartext buffers in order to keep
// the previous certificate in memory so that it can be verified by the
// next one.
var cert_buf_index: usize = 0;
var write_seq: u64 = 0;
var read_seq: u64 = 0;
var prev_cert: Certificate.Parsed = undefined;
const CipherState = enum {
/// No cipher is in use
cleartext,
/// Handshake cipher is in use
handshake,
/// Application cipher is in use
application,
};
var pending_cipher_state: CipherState = .cleartext;
var cipher_state = pending_cipher_state;
const HandshakeState = enum {
/// In this state we expect only a server hello message.
hello,
/// In this state we expect only an encrypted_extensions message.
encrypted_extensions,
/// In this state we expect certificate handshake messages.
certificate,
/// In this state we expect certificate or certificate_verify messages.
/// certificate messages are ignored since the trust chain is already
/// established.
trust_chain_established,
/// In this state, we expect only the server_hello_done handshake message.
server_hello_done,
/// In this state, we expect only the finished handshake message.
finished,
};
var handshake_state: HandshakeState = .hello;
var handshake_cipher: tls.HandshakeCipher = undefined;
var main_cert_pub_key: CertificatePublicKey = undefined;
var tls12_negotiated_group: ?tls.NamedGroup = null;
const now_sec = std.time.timestamp();
var cleartext_fragment_start: usize = 0;
var cleartext_fragment_end: usize = 0;
var cleartext_bufs: [2][tls.max_ciphertext_inner_record_len]u8 = undefined;
fragment: while (true) {
// Ensure the input buffer pointer is stable in this scope.
input.rebase(tls.max_ciphertext_record_len) catch |err| switch (err) {
error.EndOfStream => {}, // We have assurance the remainder of stream can be buffered.
};
const record_header = input.peek(tls.record_header_len) catch |err| switch (err) {
error.EndOfStream => return error.TlsConnectionTruncated,
error.ReadFailed => return error.ReadFailed,
};
const record_ct = input.takeEnumNonexhaustive(tls.ContentType, .big) catch unreachable; // already peeked
input.toss(2); // legacy_version
const record_len = input.takeInt(u16, .big) catch unreachable; // already peeked
if (record_len > tls.max_ciphertext_len) return error.TlsRecordOverflow;
const record_buffer = input.take(record_len) catch |err| switch (err) {
error.EndOfStream => return error.TlsConnectionTruncated,
error.ReadFailed => return error.ReadFailed,
};
var record_decoder: tls.Decoder = .fromTheirSlice(record_buffer);
var ctd, const ct = content: switch (cipher_state) {
.cleartext => .{ record_decoder, record_ct },
.handshake => {
assert(tls_version == .tls_1_3);
if (record_ct != .application_data) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
try record_decoder.ensure(record_len);
const cleartext_buf = &cleartext_bufs[cert_buf_index % 2];
switch (handshake_cipher) {
inline else => |*p| {
const pv = &p.version.tls_1_3;
const P = @TypeOf(p.*).A;
if (record_len < P.AEAD.tag_length) return error.TlsRecordOverflow;
const ciphertext = record_decoder.slice(record_len - P.AEAD.tag_length);
const cleartext_fragment_buf = cleartext_buf[cleartext_fragment_end..];
if (ciphertext.len > cleartext_fragment_buf.len) return error.TlsRecordOverflow;
const cleartext = cleartext_fragment_buf[0..ciphertext.len];
const auth_tag = record_decoder.array(P.AEAD.tag_length).*;
const nonce = nonce: {
const V = @Vector(P.AEAD.nonce_length, u8);
const pad = [1]u8{0} ** (P.AEAD.nonce_length - 8);
const operand: V = pad ++ @as([8]u8, @bitCast(big(read_seq)));
break :nonce @as(V, pv.server_handshake_iv) ^ operand;
};
P.AEAD.decrypt(cleartext, ciphertext, auth_tag, record_header, nonce, pv.server_handshake_key) catch
return error.TlsBadRecordMac;
// TODO use scalar, non-slice version
cleartext_fragment_end += mem.trimEnd(u8, cleartext, "\x00").len;
},
}
read_seq += 1;
cleartext_fragment_end -= 1;
const ct: tls.ContentType = @enumFromInt(cleartext_buf[cleartext_fragment_end]);
if (ct != .handshake) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
break :content .{ tls.Decoder.fromTheirSlice(@constCast(cleartext_buf[cleartext_fragment_start..cleartext_fragment_end])), ct };
},
.application => {
assert(tls_version == .tls_1_2);
if (record_ct != .handshake) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
try record_decoder.ensure(record_len);
const cleartext_buf = &cleartext_bufs[cert_buf_index % 2];
switch (handshake_cipher) {
inline else => |*p| {
const pv = &p.version.tls_1_2;
const P = @TypeOf(p.*).A;
if (record_len < P.record_iv_length + P.mac_length) return error.TlsRecordOverflow;
const message_len: u16 = record_len - P.record_iv_length - P.mac_length;
const cleartext_fragment_buf = cleartext_buf[cleartext_fragment_end..];
if (message_len > cleartext_fragment_buf.len) return error.TlsRecordOverflow;
const cleartext = cleartext_fragment_buf[0..message_len];
const ad = mem.toBytes(big(read_seq)) ++
record_header[0 .. 1 + 2] ++
mem.toBytes(big(message_len));
const record_iv = record_decoder.array(P.record_iv_length).*;
const masked_read_seq = read_seq &
comptime std.math.shl(u64, std.math.maxInt(u64), 8 * P.record_iv_length);
const nonce: [P.AEAD.nonce_length]u8 = nonce: {
const V = @Vector(P.AEAD.nonce_length, u8);
const pad = [1]u8{0} ** (P.AEAD.nonce_length - 8);
const operand: V = pad ++ @as([8]u8, @bitCast(big(masked_read_seq)));
break :nonce @as(V, pv.app_cipher.server_write_IV ++ record_iv) ^ operand;
};
const ciphertext = record_decoder.slice(message_len);
const auth_tag = record_decoder.array(P.mac_length);
P.AEAD.decrypt(cleartext, ciphertext, auth_tag.*, ad, nonce, pv.app_cipher.server_write_key) catch return error.TlsBadRecordMac;
cleartext_fragment_end += message_len;
},
}
read_seq += 1;
break :content .{ tls.Decoder.fromTheirSlice(cleartext_buf[cleartext_fragment_start..cleartext_fragment_end]), record_ct };
},
};
switch (ct) {
.alert => {
ctd.ensure(2) catch continue :fragment;
if (options.alert) |a| a.* = .{
.level = ctd.decode(tls.Alert.Level),
.description = ctd.decode(tls.Alert.Description),
};
return error.TlsAlert;
},
.change_cipher_spec => {
ctd.ensure(1) catch continue :fragment;
if (ctd.decode(tls.ChangeCipherSpecType) != .change_cipher_spec) return error.TlsIllegalParameter;
cipher_state = pending_cipher_state;
},
.handshake => while (true) {
ctd.ensure(4) catch continue :fragment;
const handshake_type = ctd.decode(tls.HandshakeType);
const handshake_len = ctd.decode(u24);
var hsd = ctd.sub(handshake_len) catch continue :fragment;
const wrapped_handshake = ctd.buf[ctd.idx - handshake_len - 4 .. ctd.idx];
switch (handshake_type) {
.server_hello => {
if (cipher_state != .cleartext) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
if (handshake_state != .hello) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
try hsd.ensure(2 + 32 + 1);
const legacy_version = hsd.decode(u16);
@memcpy(&server_hello_rand, hsd.array(32));
if (mem.eql(u8, &server_hello_rand, &tls.hello_retry_request_sequence)) {
// This is a HelloRetryRequest message. This client implementation
// does not expect to get one.
return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
}
const legacy_session_id_echo_len = hsd.decode(u8);
try hsd.ensure(legacy_session_id_echo_len + 2 + 1);
const legacy_session_id_echo = hsd.slice(legacy_session_id_echo_len);
const cipher_suite_tag = hsd.decode(tls.CipherSuite);
hsd.skip(1); // legacy_compression_method
var supported_version: ?u16 = null;
if (!hsd.eof()) {
try hsd.ensure(2);
const extensions_size = hsd.decode(u16);
var all_extd = try hsd.sub(extensions_size);
while (!all_extd.eof()) {
try all_extd.ensure(2 + 2);
const et = all_extd.decode(tls.ExtensionType);
const ext_size = all_extd.decode(u16);
var extd = try all_extd.sub(ext_size);
switch (et) {
.supported_versions => {
if (supported_version) |_| return error.TlsIllegalParameter;
try extd.ensure(2);
supported_version = extd.decode(u16);
},
.key_share => {
if (key_share.getSharedSecret()) |_| return error.TlsIllegalParameter;
try extd.ensure(4);
const named_group = extd.decode(tls.NamedGroup);
const key_size = extd.decode(u16);
try extd.ensure(key_size);
try key_share.exchange(named_group, extd.slice(key_size));
},
else => {},
}
}
}
tls_version = @enumFromInt(supported_version orelse legacy_version);
switch (tls_version) {
.tls_1_3 => if (!mem.eql(u8, legacy_session_id_echo, &legacy_session_id)) return error.TlsIllegalParameter,
.tls_1_2 => if (mem.eql(u8, server_hello_rand[24..31], "DOWNGRD") and
server_hello_rand[31] >> 1 == 0x00) return error.TlsIllegalParameter,
else => return error.TlsIllegalParameter,
}
switch (cipher_suite_tag) {
inline .AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
.AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
.CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
.AEGIS_256_SHA512,
.AEGIS_128L_SHA256,
.ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
.ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
.ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
=> |tag| {
handshake_cipher = @unionInit(tls.HandshakeCipher, @tagName(tag.with()), .{
.transcript_hash = .init(.{}),
.version = undefined,
});
const p = &@field(handshake_cipher, @tagName(tag.with()));
p.transcript_hash.update(cleartext_header[tls.record_header_len..]); // Client Hello part 1
p.transcript_hash.update(host); // Client Hello part 2
p.transcript_hash.update(wrapped_handshake);
},
else => return error.TlsIllegalParameter,
}
switch (tls_version) {
.tls_1_3 => {
switch (cipher_suite_tag) {
inline .AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
.AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
.CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
.AEGIS_256_SHA512,
.AEGIS_128L_SHA256,
=> |tag| {
const sk = key_share.getSharedSecret() orelse return error.TlsIllegalParameter;
const p = &@field(handshake_cipher, @tagName(tag.with()));
const P = @TypeOf(p.*).A;
const hello_hash = p.transcript_hash.peek();
const zeroes = [1]u8{0} ** P.Hash.digest_length;
const early_secret = P.Hkdf.extract(&[1]u8{0}, &zeroes);
const empty_hash = tls.emptyHash(P.Hash);
p.version = .{ .tls_1_3 = undefined };
const pv = &p.version.tls_1_3;
const hs_derived_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, early_secret, "derived", &empty_hash, P.Hash.digest_length);
pv.handshake_secret = P.Hkdf.extract(&hs_derived_secret, sk);
const ap_derived_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, pv.handshake_secret, "derived", &empty_hash, P.Hash.digest_length);
pv.master_secret = P.Hkdf.extract(&ap_derived_secret, &zeroes);
const client_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, pv.handshake_secret, "c hs traffic", &hello_hash, P.Hash.digest_length);
const server_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, pv.handshake_secret, "s hs traffic", &hello_hash, P.Hash.digest_length);
if (options.ssl_key_log) |key_log| logSecrets(key_log.writer, .{
.client_random = &client_hello_rand,
}, .{
.SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET = &server_secret,
.CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET = &client_secret,
});
pv.client_finished_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "finished", "", P.Hmac.key_length);
pv.server_finished_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "finished", "", P.Hmac.key_length);
pv.client_handshake_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "key", "", P.AEAD.key_length);
pv.server_handshake_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "key", "", P.AEAD.key_length);
pv.client_handshake_iv = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "iv", "", P.AEAD.nonce_length);
pv.server_handshake_iv = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "iv", "", P.AEAD.nonce_length);
},
else => return error.TlsIllegalParameter,
}
pending_cipher_state = .handshake;
handshake_state = .encrypted_extensions;
},
.tls_1_2 => switch (cipher_suite_tag) {
.ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
.ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
.ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
=> handshake_state = .certificate,
else => return error.TlsIllegalParameter,
},
else => return error.TlsIllegalParameter,
}
},
.encrypted_extensions => {
if (tls_version != .tls_1_3) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
if (cipher_state != .handshake) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
if (handshake_state != .encrypted_extensions) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
switch (handshake_cipher) {
inline else => |*p| p.transcript_hash.update(wrapped_handshake),
}
try hsd.ensure(2);
const total_ext_size = hsd.decode(u16);
var all_extd = try hsd.sub(total_ext_size);
while (!all_extd.eof()) {
try all_extd.ensure(4);
const et = all_extd.decode(tls.ExtensionType);
const ext_size = all_extd.decode(u16);
const extd = try all_extd.sub(ext_size);
_ = extd;
switch (et) {
.server_name => {},
else => {},
}
}
handshake_state = .certificate;
},
.certificate => cert: {
if (cipher_state == .application) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
switch (handshake_state) {
.certificate => {},
.trust_chain_established => break :cert,
else => return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage,
}
switch (handshake_cipher) {
inline else => |*p| p.transcript_hash.update(wrapped_handshake),
}
switch (tls_version) {
.tls_1_3 => {
try hsd.ensure(1 + 3);
const cert_req_ctx_len = hsd.decode(u8);
if (cert_req_ctx_len != 0) return error.TlsIllegalParameter;
},
.tls_1_2 => try hsd.ensure(3),
else => unreachable,
}
const certs_size = hsd.decode(u24);
var certs_decoder = try hsd.sub(certs_size);
while (!certs_decoder.eof()) {
try certs_decoder.ensure(3);
const cert_size = certs_decoder.decode(u24);
const certd = try certs_decoder.sub(cert_size);
if (tls_version == .tls_1_3) {
try certs_decoder.ensure(2);
const total_ext_size = certs_decoder.decode(u16);
const all_extd = try certs_decoder.sub(total_ext_size);
_ = all_extd;
}
const subject_cert: Certificate = .{
.buffer = certd.buf,
.index = @intCast(certd.idx),
};
const subject = try subject_cert.parse();
if (cert_index == 0) {
// Verify the host on the first certificate.
switch (options.host) {
.no_verification => {},
.explicit => try subject.verifyHostName(host),
}
// Keep track of the public key for the
// certificate_verify message later.
try main_cert_pub_key.init(subject.pub_key_algo, subject.pubKey());
} else {
try prev_cert.verify(subject, now_sec);
}
switch (options.ca) {
.no_verification => {
handshake_state = .trust_chain_established;
break :cert;
},
.self_signed => {
try subject.verify(subject, now_sec);
handshake_state = .trust_chain_established;
break :cert;
},
.bundle => |ca_bundle| if (ca_bundle.verify(subject, now_sec)) |_| {
handshake_state = .trust_chain_established;
break :cert;
} else |err| switch (err) {
error.CertificateIssuerNotFound => {},
else => |e| return e,
},
}
prev_cert = subject;
cert_index += 1;
}
cert_buf_index += 1;
},
.server_key_exchange => {
if (tls_version != .tls_1_2) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
if (cipher_state != .cleartext) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
switch (handshake_state) {
.trust_chain_established => {},
.certificate => return error.TlsCertificateNotVerified,
else => return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage,
}
switch (handshake_cipher) {
inline else => |*p| p.transcript_hash.update(wrapped_handshake),
}
try hsd.ensure(1 + 2 + 1);
const curve_type = hsd.decode(u8);
if (curve_type != 0x03) return error.TlsIllegalParameter; // named_curve
const named_group = hsd.decode(tls.NamedGroup);
tls12_negotiated_group = named_group;
const key_size = hsd.decode(u8);
try hsd.ensure(key_size);
const server_pub_key = hsd.slice(key_size);
try main_cert_pub_key.verifySignature(&hsd, &.{ &client_hello_rand, &server_hello_rand, hsd.buf[0..hsd.idx] });
try key_share.exchange(named_group, server_pub_key);
handshake_state = .server_hello_done;
},
.server_hello_done => {
if (tls_version != .tls_1_2) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
if (cipher_state != .cleartext) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
if (handshake_state != .server_hello_done) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
const public_key_bytes: []const u8 = switch (tls12_negotiated_group orelse .secp256r1) {
.secp256r1 => &key_share.secp256r1_kp.public_key.toUncompressedSec1(),
.secp384r1 => &key_share.secp384r1_kp.public_key.toUncompressedSec1(),
.x25519 => &key_share.x25519_kp.public_key,
else => return error.TlsIllegalParameter,
};
const client_key_exchange_prefix = .{@intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.handshake)} ++
int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_2)) ++
int(u16, @intCast(public_key_bytes.len + 5)) ++ // record length
.{@intFromEnum(tls.HandshakeType.client_key_exchange)} ++
int(u24, @intCast(public_key_bytes.len + 1)) ++ // handshake message length
.{@as(u8, @intCast(public_key_bytes.len))}; // public key length
const client_change_cipher_spec_msg = .{@intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.change_cipher_spec)} ++
int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_2)) ++
array(u16, tls.ChangeCipherSpecType, .{.change_cipher_spec});
const pre_master_secret = key_share.getSharedSecret().?;
switch (handshake_cipher) {
inline else => |*p| {
const P = @TypeOf(p.*).A;
p.transcript_hash.update(wrapped_handshake);
p.transcript_hash.update(client_key_exchange_prefix[tls.record_header_len..]);
p.transcript_hash.update(public_key_bytes);
const master_secret = hmacExpandLabel(P.Hmac, pre_master_secret, &.{
"master secret",
&client_hello_rand,
&server_hello_rand,
}, 48);
if (options.ssl_key_log) |key_log| logSecrets(key_log.writer, .{
.client_random = &client_hello_rand,
}, .{
.CLIENT_RANDOM = &master_secret,
});
const key_block = hmacExpandLabel(
P.Hmac,
&master_secret,
&.{ "key expansion", &server_hello_rand, &client_hello_rand },
@sizeOf(P.Tls_1_2),
);
const client_verify_cleartext = .{@intFromEnum(tls.HandshakeType.finished)} ++
array(u24, u8, hmacExpandLabel(
P.Hmac,
&master_secret,
&.{ "client finished", &p.transcript_hash.peek() },
P.verify_data_length,
));
p.transcript_hash.update(&client_verify_cleartext);
p.version = .{ .tls_1_2 = .{
.expected_server_verify_data = hmacExpandLabel(
P.Hmac,
&master_secret,
&.{ "server finished", &p.transcript_hash.finalResult() },
P.verify_data_length,
),
.app_cipher = mem.bytesToValue(P.Tls_1_2, &key_block),
} };
const pv = &p.version.tls_1_2;
const nonce: [P.AEAD.nonce_length]u8 = nonce: {
const V = @Vector(P.AEAD.nonce_length, u8);
const pad = [1]u8{0} ** (P.AEAD.nonce_length - 8);
const operand: V = pad ++ @as([8]u8, @bitCast(big(write_seq)));
break :nonce @as(V, pv.app_cipher.client_write_IV ++ pv.app_cipher.client_salt) ^ operand;
};
var client_verify_msg = .{@intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.handshake)} ++
int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_2)) ++
array(u16, u8, nonce[P.fixed_iv_length..].* ++
@as([client_verify_cleartext.len + P.mac_length]u8, undefined));
P.AEAD.encrypt(
client_verify_msg[client_verify_msg.len - P.mac_length -
client_verify_cleartext.len ..][0..client_verify_cleartext.len],
client_verify_msg[client_verify_msg.len - P.mac_length ..][0..P.mac_length],
&client_verify_cleartext,
mem.toBytes(big(write_seq)) ++ client_verify_msg[0 .. 1 + 2] ++ int(u16, client_verify_cleartext.len),
nonce,
pv.app_cipher.client_write_key,
);
var all_msgs_vec: [4][]const u8 = .{
&client_key_exchange_prefix,
public_key_bytes,
&client_change_cipher_spec_msg,
&client_verify_msg,
};
try output.writeVecAll(&all_msgs_vec);
try output.flush();
},
}
write_seq += 1;
pending_cipher_state = .application;
handshake_state = .finished;
},
.certificate_verify => {
if (tls_version != .tls_1_3) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
if (cipher_state != .handshake) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
switch (handshake_state) {
.trust_chain_established => {},
.certificate => return error.TlsCertificateNotVerified,
else => return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage,
}
switch (handshake_cipher) {
inline else => |*p| {
try main_cert_pub_key.verifySignature(&hsd, &.{
" " ** 64 ++ "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify\x00",
&p.transcript_hash.peek(),
});
p.transcript_hash.update(wrapped_handshake);
},
}
handshake_state = .finished;
},
.finished => {
if (cipher_state == .cleartext) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
if (handshake_state != .finished) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
// This message is to trick buggy proxies into behaving correctly.
const client_change_cipher_spec_msg = .{@intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.change_cipher_spec)} ++
int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_2)) ++
array(u16, tls.ChangeCipherSpecType, .{.change_cipher_spec});
const app_cipher = app_cipher: switch (handshake_cipher) {
inline else => |*p, tag| switch (tls_version) {
.tls_1_3 => {
const pv = &p.version.tls_1_3;
const P = @TypeOf(p.*).A;
try hsd.ensure(P.Hmac.mac_length);
const finished_digest = p.transcript_hash.peek();
p.transcript_hash.update(wrapped_handshake);
const expected_server_verify_data = tls.hmac(P.Hmac, &finished_digest, pv.server_finished_key);
if (!std.crypto.timing_safe.eql([P.Hmac.mac_length]u8, expected_server_verify_data, hsd.array(P.Hmac.mac_length).*)) return error.TlsDecryptError;
const handshake_hash = p.transcript_hash.finalResult();
const verify_data = tls.hmac(P.Hmac, &handshake_hash, pv.client_finished_key);
const out_cleartext = .{@intFromEnum(tls.HandshakeType.finished)} ++
array(u24, u8, verify_data) ++
.{@intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.handshake)};
const wrapped_len = out_cleartext.len + P.AEAD.tag_length;
var finished_msg = .{@intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.application_data)} ++
int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_2)) ++
array(u16, u8, @as([wrapped_len]u8, undefined));
const ad = finished_msg[0..tls.record_header_len];
const ciphertext = finished_msg[tls.record_header_len..][0..out_cleartext.len];
const auth_tag = finished_msg[finished_msg.len - P.AEAD.tag_length ..];
const nonce = pv.client_handshake_iv;
P.AEAD.encrypt(ciphertext, auth_tag, &out_cleartext, ad, nonce, pv.client_handshake_key);
var all_msgs_vec: [2][]const u8 = .{
&client_change_cipher_spec_msg,
&finished_msg,
};
try output.writeVecAll(&all_msgs_vec);
try output.flush();
const client_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, pv.master_secret, "c ap traffic", &handshake_hash, P.Hash.digest_length);
const server_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, pv.master_secret, "s ap traffic", &handshake_hash, P.Hash.digest_length);
if (options.ssl_key_log) |key_log| logSecrets(key_log.writer, .{
.counter = key_seq,
.client_random = &client_hello_rand,
}, .{
.SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET = &server_secret,
.CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET = &client_secret,
});
key_seq += 1;
break :app_cipher @unionInit(tls.ApplicationCipher, @tagName(tag), .{ .tls_1_3 = .{
.client_secret = client_secret,
.server_secret = server_secret,
.client_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "key", "", P.AEAD.key_length),
.server_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "key", "", P.AEAD.key_length),
.client_iv = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "iv", "", P.AEAD.nonce_length),
.server_iv = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "iv", "", P.AEAD.nonce_length),
} });
},
.tls_1_2 => {
const pv = &p.version.tls_1_2;
const P = @TypeOf(p.*).A;
try hsd.ensure(P.verify_data_length);
if (!std.crypto.timing_safe.eql([P.verify_data_length]u8, pv.expected_server_verify_data, hsd.array(P.verify_data_length).*)) return error.TlsDecryptError;
break :app_cipher @unionInit(tls.ApplicationCipher, @tagName(tag), .{ .tls_1_2 = pv.app_cipher });
},
else => unreachable,
},
};
if (options.ssl_key_log) |ssl_key_log| ssl_key_log.* = .{
.client_key_seq = key_seq,
.server_key_seq = key_seq,
.client_random = client_hello_rand,
.writer = ssl_key_log.writer,
};
return .{
.input = input,
.reader = .{
.buffer = options.read_buffer,
.vtable = &.{
.stream = stream,
.readVec = readVec,
},
.seek = 0,
.end = 0,
},
.output = output,
.writer = .{
.buffer = options.write_buffer,
.vtable = &.{
.drain = drain,
.flush = flush,
},
},
.tls_version = tls_version,
.read_seq = switch (tls_version) {
.tls_1_3 => 0,
.tls_1_2 => read_seq,
else => unreachable,
},
.write_seq = switch (tls_version) {
.tls_1_3 => 0,
.tls_1_2 => write_seq,
else => unreachable,
},
.received_close_notify = false,
.allow_truncation_attacks = options.allow_truncation_attacks,
.application_cipher = app_cipher,
.ssl_key_log = options.ssl_key_log,
};
},
else => return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage,
}
if (ctd.eof()) break;
cleartext_fragment_start = ctd.idx;
},
else => return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage,
}
cleartext_fragment_start = 0;
cleartext_fragment_end = 0;
}
}